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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LARRY J. SHELMIDINE, et. al.

:

Plaintiff s-Respondents
CHARLENE POLLY COOK,
Interwenor

:
:

vs.
CHARLES A. JONES, et. a l . ,

:

Defendants-Appellants.

:

Case No. 14152

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS - CROSS APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF
THE CASE
The appellants, Justices of the Peace of Precincts in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, appeal from the action of the District Court, Third Judicial
District, granting respondents, defendants charged with criminal offenses,
an extraordinary writ in the nature of prohibition precluding the appellants
as non-lawyer justices of the peace from imposing imprisonment or jail
sentences on conviction of a criminal offense otherwise within their
jurisdiction.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The respondents filed a petition for an extraordinary writ in the
nature of prohibition in the District Court, Third Judicial District, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, against the appellants. The respondents sought
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a final order prohibiting any of the appellants from presiding over a
criminal trial where a jail sentence may be imposed absent a waiver from
the respondents. An answer was entered by the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office for the appellants in their official capacity and
thereafter an entry of appearance was filed by Robert D. Moore, as
attorney for the appellants personally. The action was originally filed
as a class action and application was made to have the matter certified as a
class action. The court on the 21st day of May, 1975, denied certification
of the matter as a class action and thereafter the case was submitted
on each party's motion for summary judgment. A motion to intervene
on behalf of Charlene Polly Cook was subsequently filed and granted.
The trial court entered a memorandum decision on the 3rd day of
June, 1975, and an extraordinary writ was thereafter entered prohibiting
the appellants from imposing jail sentences or imprisonment on the respondents in the event the respondents were convicted of the charges pending
against them.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL AND CROSS APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the District Court's order granting
a writ in the nature of prohibition and remand of the case for further
proceedings on the charges filed against respondents. Respondents pursuant
to their duly filed cross appeal under Rules 74 and 75 d of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure seek an order directing that the writ in the nature of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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prohibition be entered as originally prayed for in respondent's original
•

'

•

.

.

•

•

•
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•

•

'
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'
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'

I

complaint. Specifically on cross-appeal respondents requests a writ
in the nature of prohibition preventing appellant lay-justices from
hearing any criminal cases involving charges in which a jail sentence
may be the ultimate result.
Alternatively respondent's ask for an order affirming the District
Court's memorandum decision and an order granting a writ in the nature of
prohibition which prevents the appellant lay justices from imposing
imprisonment or a jail sentence upon a conviction of an offense overwfrtfch
they otherwise have jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents stand charged with the crime of driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, Section 41-6-44 Utah Code Annotated (1953 *
as amended!). Respondent Larry J. Shelmidine's case was set for trial
before appellant Charles A. Jones on January 16, 1975. Respondent John
R. Reeves' case was set for trial before Lynn D. Bernard on March 25,
1975. Respondent Charlene P. Cook's case was set for trial before
Charles A. Jones on April 10, 1975. The penalty involved if respondents
are found guilty is imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor
more that six months, or by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than
$299, or hy both such fine and imprisonment. Section 41-6-44 Utah Code
Annotated (1953). Trials for all respondents were stayed pending the
outcome of Digitized
this case.
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Respondents sought a petition for an extraordinary writ in the nature
of prohibition forbiding appellants from hearing criminal cases where
imposition of imprisonment or a jail sentence was possible.
At the time of the hearing on motion for summary judgement, it
was stipulated that none of the appellants were a member of the Bar of the
State of Utah.
ARGUMENT
In this case as originally filed in the District Court, respondent's
sought extraordinary relief in the nature of prohibition permanently prohibiting
the appellant lay justices from presiding over any criminal case where a jail
sentence may be imposed absenttherequisite waiver. The District Court
modified the relief sought by respondents ruling only that appellants could
not impose any imprisonment or jail sentence, but could in effect continue
to hear criminal cases where a jail sentence might result as long as
appellant's did not in fact impose such a sentence. Respondents respectfully
submit, pursuant to the cross appeal heretofore taken under Rules 74
and 75 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the District Court's
order should be modified to allow for the relief originally prayed and that
this Court should prohibit the appellant lay justices from hearing any
criminal case where a jail sentence might result. Such a ruling would
bring the decision within the meaning of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S.
25 (1972) thus granting respondents original prayer for relief.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Alternatively respondent's ask affirmance of the District
Court's ruling and order granting the writ in the nature of prohibition.
POINTI
DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES REQUIRES THAT A JUDGE IN A CRIMINAL
CASE IN WHICH A JAIL SENTENCE MAY BE IMPOSED
BE A LAWYER.
Respondent's submit that the practice of allowing the
appellants to preside over criminal cases wherein a jail sentence may be
imposed is a denial of a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial and thus, is
in violation of Due Process of Law as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The right to a fair trial is protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Lay Justice of the Peace system in Salt
Lake County is fraught with arbitrary justice resulting in a denial of due
process. Lay judges in Salt Lake County have jurisdiction over many
complex matters that directly affect the liberty of the accused, and their
jurisdiction results in a denial of due process of law that cannot be remedied
by according the accused the right to appeal.
The U. S. Supreme Court has held that all defendants are entitled to
a fair trial, Adamson vs. California, 332 U. S. 46, reh. den. 332 U. S. 784
(1947); Tumey v,Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927). While the Fourteenth Amendment
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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is not a guarantee that a trial shall be devoid of error, if the error is
gross and obvious, coming close to the boundary of arbitrary action,
there is a violation of due process, Roberts v. New York City, 295 U. S.
264 (1934). Due process further requires that different criminal procedure
in the several states nevertheless should be subject to the overriding
requirements of fundamental fairness implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655 (1961). No matter how wellmeaning a lay judge may be, there are compelling reasons why he should not
be permitted to perform judicial functions in proceedings which affect
the liberty of the accused.
The Supreme Court of California has recently held, in the case
of Gordon v. Justice Court,

115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 12 Cal. 12 Cal. 3d

323, 525 P. 2d 72 (1974), cert. den. 43 L. Ed. 2d 415 (Feb. 18, 1975)
that the use of non-lawyer judges in criminal cases where a jail sentence may
r esult is a patent .denial of due process of law.
The court in that case held:
. . . we conclude that, under today's advanced standards, due
process demands that henceforth a defendant charged with an
offense carrying a possible jail sentence must be provided
with an attorney judge to preside over the proceedings, unless
he elects to waive such right. (525 P. 2d at 79)
Gordon and Arguijo, the defendants in that case, were brought
before different non-attorney justice court judges to stand trial for
misdemeanors, punishable with a possible jail sentence. Gordon was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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charged with distrubing the peace and failure to disperse and Arguijo
with driving under the influence of alcohol. The California Supreme
Court, in bank, unanimously held that due to the lack of legal training
"a reasonable likelihood exists that a non-attorney judge will be unable to
afford a defendant a fair trial. " (525 P. 2d at 79).
An analysis of the California Court's opinion in Gordon demands
a determination that the use of lay judges in the justice of the peace courts
of Salt Lake County suffers the same constitutional infirmities as the
California system.
Justices of the Peace in Utah have criminal jurisdiction over
several specified misdemeanors and all misdemeanors punishable by
up to a Three Hundred Dollar ($300.00) fine or six (6) months
in prison or both, Section 78-5-4 Utah Code Annotated (1953). The
jurisdiction of the California justice courts, struck dcwn Gordon, was
very similar (See 525 P. 2d at 74). At the outset of that case the California
Court stated that no distinction of constitutional dimension could be made
solely on the fact that the justice court's deal exclusively with misdemeanor
cases. In this regard it was noted that the constitutional and legal issues
involved in a misdemeanor case:
. . . may be as complex a those involved in a trial of a more
serious offense. (See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33,
92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530). There is little guarantee
that the background of a non-attorney judge will have prepared
him to recognize these issues and resolve them according to
established legal principles. (525 P. 2d at 76).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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While noting the the breadth of the recent development of constitutionally
mandated criminal procedure, the court further opined that such functions
as charging the jury, taking guilty pleas, making difficult sentencing
decisions, and ruling on difficult constitutional and evidentiary issues
demands highly developed legal skill and training and may not be performed
by one not trained in the law (525 P. 2d at 72). Interestingly the court
noted that ruling on the complex evidentiary issues surrounding the administering of various blood alcohol tests in driving under the influence cases
is one instance where the non-attorney judge is not going to be able to
perform satisfactorily.

The respondents in the instant case, all charged

with driving under the influence, thus face the same quandry as that which
the California Court found so telling in making their decision.
The California Court found support for its landmark ruling in the
dynamic quality of the concept of Due Process of law. Quoting at length from
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27,
(1949) Justice Burke speaking for the unanimous court went on to say:

•:f

Whatever the justification for permitting laymen to preside over
criminal trials in the 1800's, it is well recognized that even
long-standing practices must meet the advancing standards
of due process. (525 P. 2d at 75).
The court then noted that the United States Supreme Court's

landmark right to counsel decisions of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S.
335, (1963) and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, (1972), recognized
that the complexities involved in defending oneself in a criminal trial are
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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beyond the capabilities of the average layman untrained in the laws
regardless of the severity of the penalty. Taking the next step the California
court said:
. . . it logically follows that the failure to provide a judge
qualified to comprehend and utilize counsel's legal arguments
likewise must be considered a denial of due process. (525 P.
2d at 78).
Thus, the decision by the California Supreme Court sets forth a
definitive ruling that the due process of law embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution finds the use of n on-lawyer
judges in criminal trials where jail-time may result, constitutionally
impermissible. Those few other cases which have dealt with this specific
issue are not so definitive and are readily distinguishable, as was noted
by the California Court. (525 P. 2d at 78).
Three of these cases, City of Decatur v. Kushner, 43 111. 2d
334, 253, N. E. 2d 425 (1969); Crouch v. Justice Court, 7 Ariz. App. 460,
440 P. 2d 1000 (1969) and Melkean v. Avent, 300 F. Supp 516 (D. C. N. D.
Miss. 1969) are pre-Argersinger v. Hamlin decisions. The precedential
value of these cases is therefore of limited validity considering the
California Court's and Judge Hanson's heavy reliance on the Argersinger
rationale for their decisions. Furthermore, in none of these cases is the
issue extant in the instant case really thoroughly discussed. In City of
Decatur v. Kushner the issue seems to have been raised by counsel as
an afterthought
and for the first time on appeal. The Supreme Court of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Illinois casually dismissed the constitutional issue with citations only to
Am. J r . , C. J. S. and state stautory and constitutional provisions.
In Crouch v. Justice Court the intermediate appellate court in
Arizona dealt solely with the issue of whether allowing a justice of the
peace to instruct the jury as to the law in a criminal misdemeanor case
is a denial of due process. The court in Crouch similarly did not reach
the precise issue at the bar today.
Melkeanv. Avent, 300 F. Supp. 516(D.C.N.D. Miss. 1969)
is even less in point. This pre-Argersinger decision embodied an action
in Federal Court to have the entire Mississippi Justice of the Peace Court
System declared unconstitutional. Importantly, however, the action in
the justice court upon which the plaintiff asked for injuctive relief in
Federal Court was a civil suit sounding in contract, and not a criminal
action. The issue as to whether a non-lawyer judge may constitutionally
preside over a criminal trial where a jail sentence may result was not
even discussed peripherally.
The other authority asserted in the briefs of appellants is likewise
of little relevance being pre-Argersinger. Moreover, like State ex rel Swann
v. Freshour, 219 Tenn 482, 410 S. W. 2d 885 (1967)nons of the cases deal with
the issue of the use of lay judges in the context of a criminal trial where
a jail sentence may result or has been imposed. That is the issue in the
instant case, contrary to the assertions of appellants this not an attempt on
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the part of respondents to overthrow the entire justice of the peace system
in Utah or ring the death knell of that system.
Appellant's rely heavily on the case of Shadwick v. City of Tampa,
407 U. S. 345 (1972) for the proposition that a lay judge is per se qualified
to preside at a criminal trial where jail time may result. Shadwick,
however, as is noted in the brief's submitted by the appellants (Brief of
Salt Lake County Attorney

at 12 and Brief of Appellants -Utah Attorney

General at 9) decided only that a non-lawyer, non-judicial clerk was
capable of determining probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant.
The issue before the Court in the instant case is not even alluded to, and
was not before the United States Supreme Court in Shadwick.
Respondents have no quarrel with the limited rule announced in that
case.

Shadwick

only reaffirms the long standing use of layman, particularly

police officers, to make a probable cause determination for arrest.
for example Section 77-13-3 Utah Code Annotated

See

(1953). Moreover, the

Court in Shadwick expressly noted that the lay-clerk issuing such warrants
would be under the close scrutiny of a judicial officer and furthermore
limited the holding to the issuance of arrest warrants. The Court was
not willing to go the next step

and decide whether a lay-clerk could

issue search warrants where the intrusion into the sanctity of home and office
might be great:

and the concommitant legal issues more complex.

The only real authority which may be found in opposition to the
California Court's decision in Gordon and Judge Hanson's decision below
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
is a series ofDigitized
decisions
from the Kentucky
of Appeals. Ditty v. Hampton
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Ky., 490 S. W. 2d 772 (1972) app. dism. 414 U. S. 885 (1973); and North v.
Russell, Ky. , 516 S. W. 2d 103 (1974) vac. and rem. 95 S. Ct. 673 (1974)1.
Ditty v. Hampton is the benchmark in Kentucky and the Court therein ruled,
post -Argersinger, that due process does not require that the court in a
criminal case be presided over by a lawyer judge. The conclusion of that
court is best embodied in the following statement:
. . . we think it is clear, accepting due process as a living
principle, that advancing standards or changing conditions have
not yet made the lawyer judge a condition of fundamental fairness.
(490 S. W. 2d at 772). (Emphasis Supplied).
The California Court, specifically citing Etttty v. Hampton,
unequivocably disagreed:
The people point out that the courts of several states have
concluded that the use of non-attorney judges is consistant
with the demands of due process . . . [citing Ditty v. Hampton
Crouch v. Justice of the Peace Court and City of Decatur v.
Kushner,] . . . yet, none of these cases convincingly resolved
the inherent inconsistancy in guaranteeing a defendant an attorney
to represent him without providing for an attorney judge to preside
at the proceedings. As we have seen a defendant's right to a fair
trial may be substantially abridged by the use of a non-attorney
judge. Gordon v. Justice Court, supra, 525 P. 2d at 78.
1. The United States Supreme Court has again recently decided to hear
the case of North v. Russell, 17 Cr. L. 4093 (6-23-75) having rioted
probable jurisdiction for appeal once again, and having accepted Briefs
on the following issue:
Are Kentucky statutes that subject defendant to trial and
potential imprisonment in court presided over by a
non lawyer judge invalid under the Fifth, Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments?
-12-
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Furthermore, Ditty v. Hampton dealt with the issue of whether
a non attorney police judge could constitutionally preside over ,Tany criminal
t r i a r or exercise nany jurisdiction in any criminal proceedings. " (490
S. W. 2d at 773). Thus, the specific issue in the instant case of nonattorney judges exercising jurisdiction over criminal cases where a jail
2
sentence might result was dealt with only collaterally, if at all.
In the instant case the District Court of the Third Judicial District
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, has followed the rationale of
the California Court in Gordon in ruling on the constitutionality of the
Utah's Justice of the Peace System.
Respondents submit, that the California Court in Gordon, and the
•i'

. f.

District Court speaking through Judge Hanson below state the better reasoned
rule and that Due Process of Law requires an attorney judge to preside
over any criminal case where a jail sentence may be the result of a
conviction.
The legislative trend in the United States also supports this point.
An increasing number of jurisdictions are abandoning lay judge systems.
At the present time, the laws of 15 jurisdictions exclude lay judges
from hearing cases in which the defendant is charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment: Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia,
Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont and Wyoming. Of these 15
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jurisdictions, moreover, 11 have also precluded lay judges from presiding
over preliminary hearings and issuing search and arrest warrants. These
facts indicate a significant trend toward the abolition of lay judge jurisdiction over criminal matters in the various states.
A model for the states was provided by the Federal Magistrates
Act, 28 U. S. C. Section 631 (1)(b)(1) (1968). That Act replaced Title 28,
Chapter 43 of the United States Code which had provided for United States
Commissioners who were not required to have legal training. The new
law requires all full-time federal magistrates to be members of the bar.
It was also the consensus of the 1971 National Conference on the Judiciary
that, "judges should be full-time officials, professionally trained in the
law and aware of its traditional values. " (Consensus Statement of the National
, Conference on the Judiciary", 55 J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 29, at 30 (1971).
More recently, the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association in February, 1974, adopted the report of the American Bar
Association's Project on Standards for Court Organization entitled,
"Court Organization".

On Page 39, the Report observed that.

"The quality of a court system is determined chiefly by the
quality of its judges".
At Section 1.21(a), Page 40, it is recommended:
"(a) Personal and professional qualifications. All persons
selected as judges should be of good moral character, emotionally
stable and mature, in good physical health, patient, courteous,
and capable of deliberation and decisiveness when required to act
on their own reasoned judgment. They should have a broad
general and legal education and should have been admitted to the
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administration, or teaching of law for a term of years commensurate
with the judicial office to which they are appointed. (Emphasis
Supplied). 3
The most recent legislative limitation on the use of non-lawyer
judges is found in the recent revision of the statute found constitutionally
wanting by Judge Hanson below. In response to the Utah District Court's
decision in that case a Special Session of the Utah Legislature recently
passed legislation which gives a defendant in a criminal case the right to
be tried and sentenced by a judge who is a member of the Utah State Bar
Association. This statute, which takes effect on September 2, 1975,
clearly shows that the often alleged problems of travel, transportation, and
lack of an adequate number of lawyers can be overcome, while providing
lawyer judges for all criminally accused. It is often argued that in states
such as Utah and Kentucky where there are few lawyers in many of the
rural counties and long distances to travel to the various county seats
where the District Courts sit, that requiring law trained judges for the
criminally accused in all misdemeanor cases becomes an impossible task.
House Bill No. 1 which amends Section 78-5-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
shows however that such arguments have little substance. This legislation
provides that District Court Judges, who must be lawyers in Utah, may
3. In accord with this recommendation see the report of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice where it
is stated that "All justices should be required to be fully trained in the law
and their duties and their line of competence should be maintained by
continuing training. " (Emphasis Supplied) The Challange of Crime In a
Free Society, United States Government Printing Office (1967), Chapter 5
at 130. cf, Digitized
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hear the cases as Justices of the Peace Pro Tempore or appoint a member
of the Utah Bar to sit as a Justice of the Peace Pro Tempore in order to
accord the criminally accused his right to a competent tribunal. This simple
solution to the problem in Utah overcomes those commonly voiced objections
to the alleged problems in mandating lawyer judges in our inferior courts.
This simple but effective response by the Utah Legislature gives effect to
the wisdom inherent in Judge Hanson's statement that:
Modern transportation and communication have considerably
alleviated much of the problem earlier encountered in effectuating
a viable means of administering effective and speedy justice
on the misdemeanor level. (Memorandum Decision at 3)
And this is true even though, as Judge Hanson noted, of the 29
Counties in Utah there are still eight counties with two or less resident
attorneys and five counties with no resident attorney.
POINT I
A
THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS BY REQUIRING TRIAL BEFORE
A NON-LAWYER JUDGE IS NOT REMEDIED BY A TRIAL DE
NOVO APPEAL
Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution and Section 78-3-5
Utah Code Annotated (1953) provide for de novo appeals from justice of
the peace courts in Utah, as does Section 78-4-17 Utah Code Annotated
(1953).
The provisions of Utah law granting trial de novo on appeal are not
an adequate substitute or remedy for a trial in the first instance before
a law trained judge competent to rule on legal issues. In Ward v. Village
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
OCR, may contain errors.
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S. 57, (1972),
the Court ruled that petitioner

convicted of two traffic offenses and sentenced to a $50 fine on each offense
was denied his right to be tried by a disinterested and impartial judge as
guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment due process where the trial took
place before a village mayor empowered by Ohio statute to sit as Judge.
The Court based its conclusion on the fact that the fines and forfeitures
imposed by the mayor as judge went to the village treasury and constituted
a major portion of village funds. The respondent argued that any error
in the trial before the mayor was cured by the availability of trial de
novo on appeal. The Court specifically rejected this contention.
Respondent also argues that any unfairness at the trial level
can be corrected on appeal and trial de novo in the County Court
of Common Pleas. We disagree. This 'procedural safeguard1
does not guarantee a fair trial in the mayor's court . . . Nor,
in any event, may the State's trial court procedure be deemed
constitutionally acceptable simply because the state eventually
offers a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled
to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance. 409 U. S. at
61-62. (Emphasis Supplied).
The appellant's rely on Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972)
for the proposition that this right to a trial de novo in the District Court
somehow clears up any constitutional infirmities in the use of non-attorney
justices of the peace. Appellants read Colten for more than it is worth.
Colten was basically concerned with whether or not on a trial de novo
appeal from a justice court to a superior court of general jurisdiction,
the superior court could enhance the punishment given the defendant in the
justice court. Specifically, the issue was whether the rule of North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969) was applicable to de novo appeals. The issue
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a criminal case where a jail sentence might result, was not at issue.
In point of fact, Coltenfs appeal was from the imposition of a fine of
$10.00 and not a jail sentence. And, the court specifically noted that the
trial judge in that Kentucky justice court was a lawyer. (407 U. S. at
114 n. 11). The holding of the Court was expressly tied to the North
Carolina v. Pearce issue:
We cannot say that the Kentucky
such, is unconstitutional or that
warranting the restraints called
Pearce, . . . (407 U. S. at 119).
dissent 407 U.S. at 122-127).

trial de novo system, as
it presents hazards
for in North Carolina v.
(Cf. Marshall, J. in

Interestingly, the Court in Colten conceded that the justice courts,
in Kentucky at least, are incapable of according an accused his
constitutional rights:
. . . the inferior courts are not designed or equipped to
conduct error-free trials, or to insure full recognition of
constitutional freedoms. They are courts of convenience
to provide speedy and inexpensive means of disposition of
charges of minor offenses. (407 U. S. at 117).
ColtenTs worth as precedent on the issue in the instant case must
be limited to its facts, for as was noted in that case:
4. One commentator has noted the inherent inconsistancy of the selfserving argument that lay justice courts really exist to the advantage of
the accused in that he gets a preview of the states case and is afforded
a speedier trial. See Note, Increased Penalty Upon Trial de Novo,
75 West Va. L. Rev. 372 (1972-1973) where the author notes that a
justice of the peace system should be envisioned not merely as a
mechanism of convenience and speedy conviction or acquittal, but
as a court of law where justice is a foreseeable product.
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Proceedings in the inferior courts are simple and speedy; and,
if the results in Colten Ts case are any evidence, the penalty
is not characteristically severe. (407 U.S. at 118).
Respondents agree that to the extent a fine and not a jail sentence
is imposed, then trial de novo review may cure any defect in the "simple
and speedy" justice of a justicecoutts of convenience.

However, where the

threat of imprisonment exists, then the defendant must be accorded a
trial before an attorney-judge as a matter of right, since at that point
the potential harm to the accused outweighs any "convenience" factor.
.

Moreover, as indicated above, Ward v. Village of Monroeville

firmly states the principle that trial de novo review is no talisman before
which the constitutional infirmaties recognized by the Court in Colten
in the inferior courts somehow vanish. The Constitution of the United
States does demand a fair trial in the "first instance. " Or as stated by the
United States Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Clark in Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363(1966). .
. . . we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the
prejudice at its inception. . .
In conclusion, the dynamic concept of Due Process of Law as
employed in Gordon and reiterated by Judge Hanson below requires that the
5. In Colten the Court noted that, following the trial in the Kentucky Circuit
Court on appeal de novo, defendant had further appeals "in the same manner
as a person tried initially in the general criminal court," 407 U. S. at 113.
In Utah there is no appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from the district court
decision except where the case involves the validity or constitutionality
of a statute. Section 78-4-17 Utah Code Annotated (1953)
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present system of allowing non-attorney judges to preside over criminal
cases where a jail sentence may result be declared unconstitutional
as violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States.
POINT II
THE PRACTICE OF HAVING NON -LAWYER JUDGES IN ALL
PARTS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY AND LAWYER JUDGES IN SALT
LAKE CITY ONLY, DEPRIVES RESPONDENTS WHO MUST BE
TRIED BEFORE NON-LAWYER JUDGES, OF EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF TFE UNITED STATES.
Respondents claim that the practice of having non-lawyer judges
in Salt Lake County with the exception of Salt Lake City where lawyer
judges preside, deprives Respondents who must be tried before non-lawyer
judges, the Equal Protection of the Laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Constitution of the State of Utah vests the judicial power of
this state in the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment, and in a Supreme
Court, district courts and in justices of the peace as well as any other
inferior courts established by law. Art. VIII, Section 1. The State
Constitution also requires that all judges of District Courts as well as
all Supreme Court Justices be members of the bar in good standing and
"learned in the law." Art. VIII, Sections 5 and 2. It is silent as to
qualifications of the judges of the justice of the peace courts, and the
legislature has never required justices of the peace to be members of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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bar or learned in the law. Section 78-5-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated
(1953). Nor is this required by Section 17-16-5 Utah Code Annotated (1953)
which establishes the election qualifications for justices of the peace.
Unlike justices of the peace, however, in all first, second, third class
cities or county seat cities which have a city judge pursuant to Section
78-4-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953), that city judge must be a member of
the bar in good standing and admitted to the practice of law. Sections
78-4-4 and 78-4-8 Utah Code Annotated (1953). The criminal jurisdiction
of city court judges where those offices exist, is the same as that of the
justices of the peace under Section 78-4-16 Utah Code Annotated (1953).
The only remote legal qualification required of justices of the peace
is that they attend at least one of two institutes supervised by the Utah
Supreme Court each year. Any justice of the peace who fails to so attend
without the written excuse of the Chief-Justice of the Utah Supreme Court
is required by statute to vacate his office.

Section 78-5-27 Utah Code

Annotated (1953). As a result of the lack of legal training required of
justices of the peace, of the eleven Justices of the Peace in Salt Lake County
only one, who was not a party-defendant to the action below, is an
attorney-judge.
6. See 78-5-4 Utah Code Annotated (1953) as to criminal jurisdiction of
justices of the peace.
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This system results in a denial of equal protection to criminal
defendants who, due to an accident of geography,happen to be charged
with a crime in an outlying area of Salt Lake County as opposed to being
charged within the confines of the jurisdiction of Salt Lake City Court
vtfiich pursuant to Sections 78-4-4, and 78-4-8 Utah Code Annotated
(1953) has lawyer- judges, or within the jurisdiction of the one attorneyjudge in the Salt Lake County Justice of the Peace System.
Although respondents herein distinguish between the classes of
attorney and non-attorney judges, the real distinction is between one
class of judges who have experienced three years of law school and then
law practice, and the class of appellant judges who have not. The difference
can accurately be characterized as that between trained and untrained
persons, needless to say the difference between the two classes is graphic.
The difference between the legal training and skill which must be
demonstrated to obtain admission to the bar and the legal training and
skill which must be demonstrated to qualify for the office of judge of the
justice court is so substantial as to be beyond dispute. Qualifications and
requirements for the admission to the practice of law in the State of Utah
are stringent. Besides certain age and citizenship requirements, the bar
applicant has the burden of showing his good moral character.

Furthermore,

admission to take the bar examination now requires Ma preliminary education
other than legal1 f and the regular and attentive study of law for a period
of thre£ years.
graduation,
however,
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admission to practice. In addition, a candidate for bar admission must
pass an intensive three-day written examination designed to test an
applicant's ability to function under pressure as well as his
substantive knowledge and analytical skill. With regard to criminal
matters an applicant must demonstrate a basic understanding of the substantive criminal law and the procedureal protections embodied in the due
process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution. See
Section 78-51-10 Utah Code Annotated (1953).
In contrast, no prior legal training, formal education, or prior
business or professional experience of any kind is required for the office
of Justice of the Peace. Persons who have never graduated from high school,
much less law school, may be elected to that position. The sole requirement
other than election, is participation in at least one supervised institute
per year. Section 78-5 -27 Utah Code Annotated (1953).
To suggest that the presence or absence of training in a judge
makes no difference in the quality of justice would be patently absurd. To
do so would imply that legal training and knowledge of the law is irrelevant
to the process of legal decision making and to the exercise of judicial functions.
The distinction involved in this action - except for one attorney
justice of the peace in Salt Lake County who has actually studied law - is
not one of subtle gradation along a continuum of legal learning. The
distinction is between trained and untrained judges - between rule by law
and rule by fiat. Dean Pound observed the importance of rule by law:
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Administration of Justice According to Law has six advantages:
(1) Law makes it possible to predict the course which the
administration of justice will take; (2) Law secures against
errors of individual judgment; (3) Law secures against
improper motives on the part of those who administer justice;
(4) Law provides "the magistrate with standards in which the
ethical ideas of the community are formulated; (5) Law gives
the magistrate the benefit of all the experience of his predecessors;
(6) Law prevents sacrifice of ultimate interests, social and
individual, to the more obvious and pressing but less weightyimmediate interests. Pound, ''Justice According to Law,
Essays on Jurisprudence from the Columbia Law Review,
230 (1963) (Emphasis in Original)
Dean Pound also observed the harmful consequences of rule by fiat:
With no training in the law, no training in the process of judicial
thought, and no mental habit of mind acquired by constant experience
in legal reasoning, it would indeed be strange if a [lay judge]
did not treat each case as a unique proposition. He has no
category or class into which he may place it, no analogies from
which to draw to solve the new problem before him. He has no
legal rules, principles or standards by which to judge the merits
of the controversy to be decided. Wholly unlike the judge who is
trained in the law, he has no precedents to guide him. In deciding
the cause before him, the lay judge is necessarily limited by his
own personal experience acquired in the short span of a single
lifetime. He cannot call on the legal experience of the ages to
assist him but is helpless to any more than apply his own personal
notions of right and wrong to the case at hand. The justice which
such tribunal is capable of dispensing is but the outcropping
of the experiences of a personality, often limited and warped by
passion and prejudice, and at best, as variable as the personalities
- •>* of the justices who comprise [the system]. . . Such justice is
not justice at all. It is unequal, uncertain, and capricious. Smith,
The Justice of the Peace System, 15 Cal. L. Rev.. 118, 127-128
(1927) quoting from Pound, Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence,
^^^•-•'75 (3rd Ed) The verdict of other legal commentators on the institution of
untrained judges is equally severe. With the metamorphosis of criminal
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law and procedure into a complex, sophisticated system governed increasingly
by a myriad of statute and case law, the overwhelming weight of learned
authority calls either for a drastic curtailment of lay judge jurisdiction
7
or for abolition of the system outright.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the distinction
between attorney judges and lay magistrates having no legal training,
and has noted that Munbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated
is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure. " In Re Gault>
387 U. S. 1, 18 (1967). The Court in Gault went out of its way to note the
absence of judicial qualifications in many juvenile proceedings, including
the non-attorney status of many juvenile judges. The court quoted with
approval the observation that Mgood will, compassion and similar virtues
are . . . admirably prevalent throughout the system, tf but that "expertise,
the keystone of the whole venture, is lacking. " 387 U. S. at 14 n. 14.
7. Vanlandingham, Decline of the Justice of the Peace, 12 Kan. L. Rev. 389
(1964); Smith, The Justice of the Peace System, 12 Cal. L. Rev. 118 (1927)
Jaeowitz, Education and Training of Justices of the Peace, 35 N. Y. S. B. J.
61 (1963); Lee, The Emergence and Evolution of a Constitutional Right to a
Fair Trial Before a Justice of the Peace, 20 Fed. B.J. Ill (1960); McDonald,
An Arbitrary Note on the Connecticut Justice of the Peace, 35 Conn. B. J.
411 (1961); Nordberg, Farewell to Illinois Justices of theTeace, 44 Chi. B.
Rec. 469 (1963); Banyon, Justice Court on Trial, 37 Mich. S.B.J. 35 (1958)
V?nderbilt, The Municipal Court in New Jersey, 10 Rut. L. Rev. 647 (1956)
Karringer, The Court of the Justice of the Peace, 60 Dick. L. Rev. 55 (1955);
Zimmerman, Justice of the Peace Courts, 21 Ore. L. Rev. 380 (1942).
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In determining whether specified state action violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an initial determination
must be made as to which standard of review is appropriate. In recent
years, the United States Supreme Court has articulated two basic tests
to be applied to equal protection cases. Under the traditional standard
of review, a statute does not deny equal protection if any facts may be
reasonably conceived to justify it. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S.
471 (1970). Under this standard, the state action or classification would
be upheld if a rational relationship can be shown for the classification,
or difference in treatment accorded classes of individuals standing in
the same or similar relationship to the state.
The second and stricter standard of review, comes into use when
there is a violation or penalization of a fundamental constitutionally
protected right. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972). Under this
standard the state must show a substantial and compelling reason for its
classification or distinction between two classes standing in the same or
similar relationship to the state.
Whether or not respondents have a constitutional right to a lawyer
judge as a matter of due process, the quality of justice which may be
reasonably expected from a lay judge is sufficiently inferior to that expected
from a lawyer judge and the interest involved sufficiently fundamental as to
require justification by a compelling governmental interest to meet the
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In Re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133 (1955V This issue was not decided in
Gordon v. Justice Court, the court finding the due process claim dispositive
of the case (525 P. 2d at 74 fn. 4).
The classification under challenge goes directly to the right of
a person to a fair trial. This right is so fundamental and so primary as
to invoke the compelling state interest test to any statutory classification
affecting it. The United States Supreme Court has frequently affirmed that
a fair trial is "the most fundamental of all freedoms" Estes v. Texas,
381 U. S. 532, 540 (1965), and that "a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process. " In Re Murchison, supra.

If, as past

judicial decisions make clear, the government must prove a compelling
interest for its classifications affecting such things as the right to
procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U. S. 535, 541(1942), state
apportionment, Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), voting eligibility
Carringtonv. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 (1965), freedom of association, Williams
v. Rhodes 393 U. S. 23 (1968) free exercise of religion, Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U. S. 398, 406 (1963), public housing eligibility Cole v. Housing Authority
of City of Newport, 312 F. Supp. 692 (D.C.R.I. 1970), hiring examinations,
Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 306 F. Supp.
1355, 1358 (D.C. Mass. 1969), and public education, Serrano v. driest,
96 Cal. Rptr. 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971), it hardly remains to be argued that the
same strict scrutiny must apply to the classification affecting the right to
a fair and impartial trial by a competent judge.
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Those cases which examine the rights of a criminally accused
under the equal protection clause rather than the due process clause
speak of "unreasoned distinctions' among classes of accused persons
which the state may justify only by showing a strong countervailing interest.
Note, for example, Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) which invalidated
a New Jersey statute which denied a free transcript on appeal only to
persons confined in state penal institutions; Mayer v. City of Chicago,
404 U. S. 189 (1971) which invalidated a court rule permitting free trial
transcripts in felony but not misdemeanor cases; and Groppi v. Wisconsin,
400 U. S. 505, 507 -508 (1971) which invalidated a state statute which categorically prevented a change of venue in a criminal jury trial in misdemeanor
cases, the apparent alternative basis of this holding is the impropriety
of a distinction drawn between felony and misdemeanor trials. See also,
Mayer v. City of Chicago, supra at 415.
J u s t as Groppi struck down a state law "that categorically prevents a
change of venue for a criminal jury trial, regardless of the extent of local
prejudice against the defendant, on the sole ground that the charge against
the defendant is labeled a misdemeanor, (400 U. S. at 508), so the scheme
under scrutiny here is invalid to the extent that it categorically prevents a
trial before an attorney-judge regardless of the complexity of defenses
or the admitted unfamiliarity of the lay-judge with the issues before him
solely on the ground that the charge against the accused is labeled a
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Salt Lake County.
Furthermore, the felony-misdemeanor distinction does not permit
a state to create differences in trial of the two classes of offenses.

For

example, the distinction does not permit infringement of the right to counsel.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra; or of state rules providing for copies of a
transcript on appeal, Mayer v. City of Chicago, supra. Indeed, the decisions
do not permit any dilution of an accused's trial rights depending on the
severity of the charge, when a jail sentence is a possible result of the charge.
Geographical variations in the basic competence of a trial judge
similarly cannot withstand constutional scrutiny. The interest of a person
charged with a misdemeanor in obtaining a fair trial clearly is a "fundamental''
interest. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). This interest is invaded
by a system which provides two classes of judges. The classification is
executed solely according to an arbitrary geographic formula and by an
impermissible felony-misdemeanor distinction. The State therefore must
demonstrate a compelling interest in maintaining such a classification
in order to uphold it. The State of Utah cannot do so in the instant case.
What exists in Salt Lake County is a system which is sanctified
by history alone but fails to meet the close scrutiny now required under
the equal protection clause. That the history of the lay judge institution
is itself a justification, and that it must pass constitutional muster by virtue
of its tradition is no justification at all. It worked in the 18th Century, the
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argument goes, and therefore it must work today. The sanctity of
history, however, can no more shield Justices of the Peace from modern
judicial requirements than it can shield a person who was authorized to
practice surgery 100 years ago from the rigorous standards of modern
medical practice. In fact, the genesis of the lay judge system as a matter
of need in a bygone era compels even greater scrutiny according to
modern standards, and must be found constitutionally impermissible
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
POINT III
THE PRACTICE OF HAVING NON-LAWYER JUDGES PRESIDE OVER
CRIMINAL CASES IN WHICH A JAIL SENTENCE MAY RESULT
PRESENTS A DEFACTO DEPRIVATION OF A CRIMINALLY
ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES.
The practice of having non-lawyer judges preside over criminal
cases in which a jail sentence may be imposed, is a violation of a criminally
accused's right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution in that non-lawyer judges
cannot be assumed to have the ability to understand complex legal arguments.
The practice of allowing lay judges to preside over criminal trials
renders the Sixth Amendment right to counsel nugatory and constitutes a
violation of due process of law. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 342
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the United States Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel applicable to the states by incorporation into the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Lay justices of the peace in Utah exercise criminal jurisdicition
over various and sundry criminal offenses. Jurisdiction of lay justices in
Utah extends over such misdemeanors as petty theft, assault and battery,
breach of the peace and all misdemeanors involving up to a $300 fine or
six (6) months imprisonment or both. Section 78-5-4- Utah Code Annotated
(1953).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel
at trial extends to all indigent criminally accused facing a jail sentence.
Argersinger v. Hamlin. The fundamental character of this right was
reiterated by giving the Argersinger decision full retroactive effect in Berry
v. City of Cincinnatti, 414 U. S. 29 (1973). However, the right to counsel is
rendered illusory where counsel must argue before a judge who is not
adequately trained in the law. If a judge is not able to rely on his own
knowledge of the legal merit of counsel's argument, he is apt to trust the
counsel of the lawyer that he is most familiar with, as he lacks an independent
standard by which to judge. This becomes the Mrule by fiat" denounced by
Dean Pound.
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A notable example of who the non-lawyer judge will turn to when a
problem arises finds startling effect in Utah. The means provided by the
State of Utah to shield the justices from legal error resulting from their
lack of learning in the law is a Manual for Justices of the Peace in the State of
Utah prepared by Brigitte M. Bodenheimer in 1956. This manual is today
hopelessly outdated and affirmatively misleading. ° The non-law trained
judge faced with a question of law and no means or ability to resolve it
is likely to rely heavily on the representations of the County Attorney. The
manual expressly approves this practice. On page 14 the following advice
appears:
There will no doubt be many occasions, however, when the
answer to his problem cannot be found in this book. In such a
case it is recommended that the justice get in touch with the county
attorney of his county who is the legal advisor of the county's
precinct officers.
Again at page 59 the manual notes:
The defendant is often not represented by counsel in a justice
court. County attorneys are accustomed to that fact and are
generally able to play the role of both prosecutor and defense
attorney with fairness to both sides. (Emphasis Supplied).
8. This manual, we are told, is in the process of being revised and brought
up to date.
-32-
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At page 71, The Justice of the Peace is given advice on instructing the
jury:
Sometimes after the justice has finished his instructions to the
juiy, one or both attorneys may ask him to add further charges
to the jury, which the attorney reads to him. The justice then
says: fI so charge' or TI refuse to so charge.' If he is in doubt
on how to rule, the county attorney, if present, will generally
come to his aid. (Emphasis Supplied).
The effect of this advice in the official Manual is to invite the
"neutral" judge to defer, when in doubt, to the decision of one of the litigant's counsel. The right to a decision by an impartial tribunal is denied
in fact whenever the untrained judge is called upon to decide a question of
law without the knowledge or training to decide it: in that situation he is
officially advised to rely upon the prosecutor! Defendant's right to be heard
in his own defense b ecomes his right to be heard by opposing counsel.
A judge who has been a lawyer is in the habit of reading the advance
sheets containing state appellate and United States Supreme Court cases as well
as law review articles. A layman is not likely to be learned in such complex
matters as the rules of evidence. The difficulty of the subject matter
of a criminal case is nowhere better exemplified than in the Utah Rules of
Evidence where the Hearsay Rule, Rule 63, for example, takes up some
21 pages embodying the Rule itself and the numerous exceptions to the Rule.
Other examples become obvious from an even cursory perusal of Volume
Eight of the Utah Code Annotated which contains the criminal code and code
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of criminal procedure.

y

The proper resolution of complex legal problems is often
crucial to the outcome of cases within the justice's jurisdiction. Since the
decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1966), extending the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule to the states, the United States Supreme
Court alone has decided literally hundreds of cases affecting the criminal
trial process. These cases affect such interests, to name only a few,
as: the right to be free from unreasonable search and s e i z u r e s , ^ the
prohibition against double jeopardy; 11 the prohibition against self9. Exemplifying this point in the cases of the respondent's are several recent
decisions of this Court involving the offense of driving under the influence
which presented difficult evidentiary issues and problems of statutory
construction. Section 41-6-44 Utah Code Annotated (1953). See eg. Gibb v.
Dorius, Utah, 533 P. 2d 299 (1975) (holding that only one acting under the
direction and or supervision of a licensed physician may withdraw blood from
one suspected of driving while under the influence); Wells v. City Court of
Logan City, Utah, 535 P. 2d 683 (1975) (person arrested for drunk driving
shall be immediately taken to a magistrate who is nearest to the place where
the arrest is made). Greaves v. State, Utah 528 P. 2d 805 (1974) (upholding
Sections 41-6-12, 41-6-44.2 Utah Code Annotated (1953) making it unlawful
for anyone with blood alcohol content of . 10 per cent or greater to drive or
be in actual control of any vehicle against void for vagueness claim); and
McCallv. Dorius, Utah; 527 P. 2d 647 (1947) (Construing implied consent
statute and propriety of revocation of driving license). Cf. State v. Cruz,
21 U. 2d 406, 446 P. 2d 307 (1968) (Discussing implied consent law in Utah).
10. Chimelv. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (limitations on "search
incident to arrest);" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971) ("the
plain view theory"); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963) (the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine); SpfoeUi v. United States, 393 U. S.
410 (1968) (search warrant affidavits). Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S.
757 (1966) (seizure of person's blood for purposes of blood alcohol test) c
11. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970) (collateral estoppel doctrine).
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13
14
M
incrimination, the admissability of confessions; the right to a "fair
15
16
and speedy public trial, including a jury of one's peers, the right to
* 17
18
confrontation and cross-examination; the right to counsel; and fair
19
treatment in sentencing.
As stated by the editors of the Criminal Law Reporter.
From the 1960-61 term through the 1968-69 term, with the
Fourteenth Amendment as a lever, nearly all the guarantees
of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments have been made
binding upon the states. At the same time, numerous U. S.
Supreme Court decisions have strengthened these guarantees.
The court's extension of the mantle of federal protections to
persons accused in State criminal proceedings and its bolstering
of these protections have brought about dramatic changes in the
criminal law.

12. Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 436 (1965) (barring comment on
failure to testify).
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 386 U. S. 436 (1966) (procedural protections
afforded during custodial interrogation); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964)
(determination of "voluntariness" of confessions).
14. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374 (1969) (unrelated incarceration does
not abrogate right).
15. Walster v. California, 394 U. S. 440 (1969) (the "totality of the
circumstances" test for due process).
16. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970) (sixth amendment right
to jury trial in misdemeanors).
17. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965) (invalidating use of prior
testimony without opportunity for cross-examination).
18. Argersinger v. Hamlin , 407 U. S. 67 (1972) (right to counsel in
misdemeanors).
19. Tate V. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971) (bars conversion of fine to
imprisonment); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969) (waiving
of rights in guilty pleas).
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It is safe to predict that changes in the criminal law will continue to
be a source of increasing complexity and controversy in the criminal process.
Moreover, resolution of cases within the jurisdiction of inferior courts
requires not only ability to understand a highly complex, controversial and
changing body of law, but also the ability to disregard the truthfulness and
probative value of illegally obtained evidence which has been heard in its
full and potentially incriminating detail. Because of the inability of the lay
person to segregate the issue of truthfulness from the issue of admissibility
and the issues of admissibility from the issue of guilt, the responsibility
for making these determinationscannot constitutionally be delegatedto a jury. 2(
Thus, the presence of defense counsel in court, his presentation of
evidence, and his arguement about the legal standards and matters of evidence
is apt to fall upon deaf ears where the judge lacks an independent standard
to apply. Since arguments based upon recent cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court and this Court in areas of constitutional law, as
well as simple evidentiary matters, may not be comprehended by the lay
judge, the constitutional guarantee of due process cannot be accorded the
20. Jackson v. Denno 378 U. S. 368 (1964) (procedure that leaves the factual
determination of the voluntariness of a confession to the jury held to be
invalid in view of the confession either in determining admissibility or in
determining guilt )
and Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968) (codefendant's confession inculpating the defeiidart cannot be used in a joint
trial even if jury specifically instructed that confession was admissible
only against the declarant).
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defendant. ^

Due process of law requires not only that a person exercising

a judicial function be fair and impartial but also that he be competent. The
wisdom of the words of Justice Sutherland speaking for the Court in Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 69 (1932) decided over forty years ago are
apposite in the instant case:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of the law. If charged with crime, he is
incapable generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment
is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or other wise inadmissible. He lacks both
the skill and the knowledge adequately to prepare his defense,
even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that
be true of men of intelligence, how much, more true is it of the
ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
The right to counsel at trial is equally as important to the preservation
of justice in misdemeanors as in felony proceedings. Argersinger v. Hamlin
supra. As Chief Justice Burger observed, concurring in Argersinger:
[A]ny deprivation of liberty is a serious matter. The issues
that must be dealt with in a trial for a petty offense or a misdemeanor may often be simpler than those involved in a felony trial
and yet be beyond the capability of a layman, especially when he is
opposed by a law-trained prosecutor. There is little ground,
21. Alexander Hamilton noted this proHem long ago, in a different context,
stating that "Laws are a dead letter, without courts to expound and define
their meaning and operation.Tt Federalist'Papers No. 15 as quoted in Hart
and Wechsler T s, The Federal Courts and the Federal System (2d ed.~ 1973)
at 24.
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therefore, to assume that a defendant unaided by counsel,
will be any more able adequately to defend himself against
the lesser charges that may involve confinement than more
serious charges. Appeal from a conviction after an uncounseled
trial is not likely to be of much help to a defendant since the die
is usually cast when judgment is entered on an uncounseled
trial record. (407 U. S. at 41).
It is clear, therefore, that justice of the peace courts cannot find
justification from the fact that lay judges in justice courts are limited to
trials of misdemeanors carrying a maximum penalty of six months
imprisonment as is the case in Utah. The distinction between so-called
"petty" and "serious" offenses has been expressly limited to the right
to jury trial (by reason of the unique legal history of the jury) and has
been notably rejected as inaaplicable to other due process rights in
misdemeanor cases. 29
For the same reasons a lay person can no longer be considered
competent to preside over the criminal trials were a jail sentence may
result within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts of Utah.
The right to counsel in these cases necessarily includes the right to a
competent law trained tribunal to hear counsel. To conclude otherwise
is to continue a system which requires that indigent criminal defendants
must be provided with counsel who are attorneys but not that they must be
provided with judges who are attorneys. This conclusion posits that the
22. In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948) (right to public trial); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965) (right to confrontation); Washington v. Texas,
388 U. S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process to secure attendance of
witnesses); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937) (right
to cross-examine).
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role of the judge who must decide or preside over a criminal case is less
crucial and less constitutionally significant than the role of the counsel
who must argue it. Respondents submit that this cannot be so.
The California Court's, obvious reliance on Argersinger in
Gordon v. Justice Court, lends credence to this assertion, and it is
respectfully submitted that the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel as
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment demands not only
counsel at the side of the accused, but an attorney-judge presiding over
the trial who is able to adequately respond to counsel when imprisonment
may result from the charge.
CONCLUSION
The practice of allowing lay judges to try cases that affect the
liberty of the accused violates the constitutional rights of those against
whom, by an accident of geography, a complaint is filed in areas where a
lay judge is sitting. The unfamiliarity of lay judges with constitutional
law and criminal law and procedure necessarily results in such a lack
of adherence to the legal precedents which are applied in other courts that
the accused are deprived due process of law and equal protection as required
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In addition,
the barrier to defense counsel's communication with an untrained judge
as to the rules and legal nuances governing the defendant's rights, results
in a de facto deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as made
applicable to the States by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although large numbers of persons each year receive their first impressions
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preside, these courts, by and large, fail to meet professional standards
of criminal law and procedure. Finally, the development of modern
means of transportation and communication and availability of sufficient
numbers of professionally trained personnel, coupled with the current
trend away from lay judge courts, should result in the discarding as a
violation of due process of law such anantiquated system which was utilized
as an expedient to meet Eighteenth Century, not Twentitieth Century, conditions.

Respectfully submitted,

STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY
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